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Abstract 
Evaluative concepts and emotions appear closely connected. According to a prominent 
account, this relation can be expressed by propositions of the form ‘something is 
admirable if and only if feeling admiration is appropriate in response to it’. The first 
section discusses various interpretations of such ‘Value-Emotion Equivalences’, for 
example the Fitting Attitude Analysis, and it offers a plausible way to read them. The 
main virtue of the proposed way to read them is that it is well-supported by a promising 
account of emotions, namely the Perceptual Theory of Emotions, which emphasises the 
analogies between emotions and sensory perceptual experiences. The second section 
considers a worry about whether concepts such as admirable are really evaluative. It is 
maintained that even though the arguments used to show that thick terms and concepts 
are not inherently evaluative can be transposed to affective concepts, these arguments can 
be resisted. So there is no need to abandon the intuitive claim that affective concepts are 
inherently evaluative. 
 
If one thinks of the admirable and admiration, of the shameful and shame, or of the 
disgusting and disgust, it is difficult to deny that there must be close ties between values, 
on the one hand, and emotions, on the other hand. Because one can distinguish between 
evaluative concepts, evaluative judgements, evaluative properties and evaluative facts, 
and also because several types of relation can be envisaged, the question of what relation 
hold between values and emotions ramifies into several distinct questions.  
Consider evaluative judgements. One option is to claim that such judgements are 
reducible to, constituted by, or identical to emotions.
1
 This option has been attractive to 
proponents of Non-Cognitivism, the view that evaluative, or more generally normative, 
judgements do not have the function of predicating evaluative properties and thus fail to 
be truth-assessable, or at least fail to be truth-assessable in any substantial way. As a view 
about judgements, Non-Cognivisism is distinct from, but congenial to two important but 
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controversial doctrines in metaethics which consider emotions to be central to ethics: 
Emotivism (or Expressivism), the semantic thesis that the function of evaluative 
sentences is to express emotions (Stevenson 1937; Ayer 1952), and Projectivism, the 
view that the evaluative is a projection of our emotions onto the world (Blackburn 1984).  
In general, views such as Non-Cognitivism, Emotivism and Projectivism are 
premised on two assumptions about the nature of emotions: a) emotions lack cognitive 
content; and b) emotions are essentially motivational states, so that by establishing a link 
to emotion, the motivational power of evaluative judgements, sentences or facts is 
supposed to be accounted for (see Ayer 1952, for instance). The recent consensus in 
emotion theory is that there is ground to question these assumptions and to adopt a 
broadly cognitive account of emotions. 
Interestingly, one of the main accounts of emotions proposes an ontology of 
emotions that amounts to a mirror-image of Non-Cognitivism. This view, 
Judgementalism, thus holds that emotions are, or necessarily require, evaluative 
judgements (Solomon 1976; Nussbaum 2001). Fear would thus be, or necessarily require, 
the judgement that what one fears is fearsome or dangerous. Another possibility is to 
posit causal relations between evaluative judgements and emotions. It is plausible to hold 
that emotions causally influence evaluative judgements, such as when your anger gets 
you to assess your opponent negatively. However, in at least some cases, it is clear that 
the causal relation goes the other way around: evaluative, or more generally normative, 
judgements play a causal role in the arousal of emotions. It should be noted that the two 
claims are not necessarily incompatible. For instance, your anger might be caused by the 
judgement that someone slighted you, but it might also influence how you assess that 
person. A further kind of relation lies at the level of epistemology. According to an 
influential account of emotions that stresses the analogies with sensory experiences, the 
so-called Perceptual Theory of Emotions (Meinong 1917; de Sousa 1987; Tappolet 2000; 
Goldie 2001) emotions would allow agents to be aware of evaluative properties in the 
same way as colour experiences allow us to be aware of colours. On the basis of this, it 
has been claimed that emotions at least prima facie justify evaluative judgements. 
However, it has also been argued that vice versa evaluative judgements justify emotions, 
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a claim that does not sit well together with the thesis that emotions are in a position to 
justify evaluative judgments.  
These are but the bare outlines of the most striking relations that can be taken to 
hold between evaluative judgements and emotions. In this paper, I want to focus on a 
distinct but related topic, that is, the relation between evaluative concepts and emotions. 
The central question addressed here is that of the relation between concepts such as 
admirable and disgusting and emotions such as admiration and disgust. 
A suggestion that has been prominent in recent debates is that the relation 
between the evaluative and emotions can be expressed in the form of propositions like the 
following: something is admirable if and only if feeling admiration is appropriate in 
response to it, something is shameful if and only if shame is appropriate with respect to it, 
something is disgusting if and only if disgust is appropriate with respect to it.
2
 Such 
propositions, which I shall call ‘Value-Emotion Equivalences’, raise the question of how 
to interpret them, something that needs to be settled before assessing their plausibility. A 
first question is how to read the bi-conditional. According to advocates of what has 
become known as the Fitting Attitude Analysis, the equivalences consist in conceptual 
analyses of the relevant evaluative concepts. But as we shall see this is not the only 
possibility. Moreover, what needs to be specified is what the relevant kind of attitude is 
supposed to be and what it is for such an attitude to be appropriate. These issues will be 
discussed in section 1, the aim of which is to present a plausible version of the Value-
Emotion Equivalences. The following section turns to an important worry regarding 
Value-Emotion Equivalences. In general, advocates of such equivalences assume that 
concepts such as admirable or disgusting are evaluative. However, in the light of debates 
about whether thick concepts are evaluative, it is reasonable to wonder whether concepts 
such as admirable or shameful really are evaluative concepts. This worry raises the deep 
question of what it is about evaluative concepts that make them evaluative. Before 
turning to this issue, let us have a closer look at the alleged relation between evaluative 
concepts and emotions. 
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1. Value-Emotion Equivalences 
 
As I said, it is difficult to deny that concepts such as admirable, shameful or disgusting, 
which I will call ‘affective concepts’ in order to be as neutral as possible with respect to 
the question whether such concepts are evaluative, have a tight connection to emotions. 
The foremost reason why this is so is simply because such concepts, of which there are a 
great many, are picked out by terms that are lexically connected to emotion terms. Thus, 
on the positive side, you have admirable, hopeful, pride-worthy, lovable, respectable, 
awesome and amusing, whereas on the negative side, there are shameful, disgusting, 
contemptible, embarrassing, fearsome, frightening, etc. Not all emotions have a lexically 
derived affective concept – consider anger or guilt, for instance – but many do, and when 
there is no natural language term, it is always possible to designate the relevant concept 
by a complex expression. Thus, things can be considered worthy of your anger or of your 
guilt. 
A further point that attests to the intimacy of affective concepts and emotions is 
that on most accounts the formal objects of emotions are picked out by affective 
concepts. It is in terms of the formal objects of emotions that the appropriateness 
conditions of emotions are specified.3 For example, most would agree that the admirable 
is the formal object of admiration, in the sense that an episode of admiration is 
appropriate on the condition that what you admire is genuinely admirable. Put in terms of 
concepts, one could say that the concept of the admirable picks out the formal object of, 
or sets the standard for, the emotion of admiration.  
Finally, and relatedly, emotions and the properties that correspond to affective 
concepts, if there are such properties, share a number of structural traits:  
                                                          
3
 According to Kenny, who is responsible for introducing the concept in contemporary emotion theory, the 
formal object of a state is the object under that description which must apply to it if it is possible to be in 
this state with respect to it (1963: 132). He claims that the description of the formal object of an emotion 
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a) Degrees. Both emotions and what can be called ‘affective properties’ allow for 
degrees.4 An interpretation of Einstein on the Beach can be more or less admirable, and 
of course, you can admire it more or less, with more or less intensity. 
b) Valence. Both affective properties and emotions have valence. They are both 
divided into two groups, which are described as positive and negative. On the side of 
positive evaluative properties, you have being admirable, being pride-worthy, being 
lovable, etc., while on the negative side, you have being despicable, shameful, disgusting, 
etc. The same kind of polarity is found in emotions, which are standardly thought to 
divide into positive and negative emotions.5 What is meant by positive and negative 
emotions can be quite different depending on the context, but in the sense in which joy is 
opposed to sadness or pride to shame, for instance, the distinction appears to mirror that 
between positive and negative evaluative concepts. 
c) Polarity. A point that is closely related to the former is that many affective 
properties and many emotions form pairs of polar opposites. On the side of values, you 
have pairs such as admirable versus despicable, pride-worthy versus shameful, while on 
the side of emotions you have admiration versus spite, pride versus humility, love versus 
hate, etc. 
 
Given these different considerations, one has to acknowledge that affective 
concepts are by nature related to specific responses: they wear their response-dependence 
on their sleeves.6 In fact, one might at first sight think that affective concepts and 
emotions are even more tightly connected than what would be true on the Value-
Emotions Equivalences. One might thus suggest that what holds is the simple bi-
conditional, according to which something is admirable in so far as one admires it, and so 
on for the other affective concepts. Such a suggestion, which is sometimes called Simple 
Subjectivism (Rachels 1986, chap. 3), will not do, however. The reason is that, as most 
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5
 Surprise might be an exception here, since it is not clear whether it is a positive or a negative emotion. 
One possibility is to say that there are two kinds of surprise, one positive, and one negative. See Ortony, 
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6
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response-dependent. For a more liberal take on response-dependence see D’Arms and Jacobson (2000, fn. 
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would agree, we sometimes admire what is not admirable. The commonly accepted 
amendment to Simple Subjectivism is to add the condition that emotions be fitting or 
appropriate. Thus, we arrive at Value-Emotion Equivalences.  
Consider the following bi-conditional: 
 
(1) x is admirable if and only feeling admiration is appropriate in response to x.  
 
Before assessing the plausibility of such propositions, it is necessary to further specify 
them. There are three interdependent questions. The first question is how to understand 
the relation between the two sides of the ‘if and only if’.  The second question concerns 
the nature of the emotional response that is referred to. The last question is what is it for 
such a response to be appropriate or fitting? Let me consider these in turn.  
The standard assumption, which as its name indicates is characteristic of the 
Fitting Attitude Analysis, is that (1) consists in an analysis of the concept admirable. The 
idea is that in what is assumed to be a strict equivalence, the concept is broken down into 
what are taken to be simpler conceptual elements, i.e. the notion of a feeling of 
admiration and the notion of appropriateness. Moreover, the equivalence is taken to be a 
conceptual truth, so that the failure to accept it betrays a failure to fully grasp the 
concept.
7
 But there are other ways to read (1). Thus, the biconditional could be held to be 
a contingent proposition that holds only in the actual world and which has to be to be 
established a posteriori. Another possibility is to read the biconditional as a possibly 
necessary, but substantial normative or even moral proposition, so that what is admirable 
is what it is that we are normatively or morally required to admire. However, the most 
prominent alternative to the Fitting Attitude Analysis interpretation is to read it as a 
conceptual elucidation, as opposed to an analysis. The equivalence would be taken to be a 
necessarily true proposition, that expresses the thought that the concept admirable is 
conceptually connected to the concepts of admiration and of appropriateness, but none of 
the concepts would be considered to be more fundamental. On such a no-priority view, 
the grasp of the two concepts would be interdependent. 
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A second important question is what kind of response is invoked in such 
equivalences. By contrast with Brentano (1889), who explicitly refers to love in his 
analysis of the concept good, Fitting Attitude Analysis theorists have not restricted 
themselves to emotions (see Ewing 1947). Quite generally, it appears possible to plug 
into a putative analysis of evaluative concepts items as varied as evaluative judgements, 
conative states (such as desires), or even types of actions.
8
  However, when considering 
affective concepts it appears difficult to avoid the reference to states that standardly count 
as emotions. The follow-up question that arises is what kind of state emotions are. 
Depending on the account of emotion that is favoured, very different versions of the 
Value-Emotion Equivalence result, ranging from the more to the less plausible. Thus, if 
one takes emotions to be or necessarily require evaluative judgements, as the 
Judgemental Theory of Emotions proposes, then we obtain the proposition that something 
is admirable if and only judging that it is admirable is appropriate. In the most obvious of 
its interpretations, this proposition is true, but also viciously circular, so that it cannot be 
offered as an account of the concept admirable. The reason is that the very same concept 
is part of the content of the judgement mentioned in the right-hand-side, so that to the 
possession of the concept to be accounted for is required to understand the proposition.
9
 
Fortunately, as will be made clear shortly, there are other theories of emotions on the 
market.  
The third question is how to understand the notion of appropriateness. This simple 
question has proven particularly tricky. Answering it is crucial to avoid what has become 
known as the Wrong Kind of Reason Objection, because it was mainly targeted at 
versions of the Fitting Attitude Analysis expressed in terms of reasons for attitudes.
10
 In a 
nutshell, what poses a problem is that there can be a reason to feel an emotion toward 
something that fails to fall under the relevant affective concept. One can for example 
have prudential reason to feel admiration towards something that clearly fails to be 
admirable. Thus, the question is whether one can specify what the right kind of reasons 
are. In the same way, it can be appropriate to feel an emotion towards something that fails 
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9
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to fall under the relevant affective concept, so that the right kind of appropriateness needs 
to be specified.  
Quite generally, there are two main ways to conceive of what it is to be 
appropriate for an emotion.
11
 The first is to take the concept to be normative or deontic. 
On this conception, an appropriate emotion is an emotion that ought to be felt. This is the 
standard account in the recent literature, but it is not the only one possible. On a different 
conception, appropriateness is a matter of correct representation. An appropriate emotion 
is an emotion that is correct from the epistemic point of view, in the sense that it 
represents things as they are, evaluatively speaking.
12
  
An important virtue of such a representational account of appropriateness is that it 
makes the Wrong Kind of Reason objection easy to handle. Since the appropriateness of 
an emotion is defined in terms of whether that emotion represents things as they are 
evaluatively speaking, it is ruled out that feeling an emotion can be appropriate, in that 
sense, with respect to something that fails to fall under the relevant evaluative concept.
13
 
According to such an account, something is admirable if and only if this thing is such that 
feeling admiration is correct in response to it, and this is so only if it is admirable. 
One might worry that such an account would not be illuminating enough to be of 
interest. It appears that what is proposed is simply that something is admirable just in 
case it is admirable, and so forth for the other affective concepts. However, there is 
reason to think that in spite of its circularity, the resulting equivalence is of interest. What 
it underlines is the crucial epistemic role that emotions play in our grasp of affective 
concepts. As David Wiggins (1987) suggested, the important point to keep in mind is that 
there is nothing more fundamental to appeal to than admiration when we try to find out 
whether or not something is admirable, and the same can be said about other affective 
concepts. 
The main virtue of this representational interpretation of the Value-Emotion 
Equivalence is that it is grounded on what is arguably a highly plausible account of 
emotions, the so-called Perceptual Theory of Emotions, according to which emotions are 
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 This suggestion is close to Danielsson and Olson’s claim that x is good means that x has properties that 
provide content-reasons to favour x, where content-reasons for an attitude are reasons for the correctness of 
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perceptual experiences of a particular kind.
14
 What is specific about emotions, compared 
to sensory perceptual experiences, is that they represent things as having evaluative 
properties. Thus, an emotion of admiration with respect to a friend will be correct just in 
case the friend is really admirable. An important point here is that on this account, 
emotions have representational, albeit not conceptually articulated, content. Emotions 
represent their object as having specific evaluative properties, that is, as fearsome or 
disgusting, etc., even though the agent who undergoes the emotion need not possess the 
relevant evaluative concepts (fearsome, disgust, etc.).
15
 
It would take us too far to discuss the Perceptual Theory of Emotions.
16
 The only 
point I would like to make here is that what makes it attractive is that it steers a middle 
course between two opposed accounts of emotions, each of which has some plausibility, 
but both of which are ultimately unsatisfactory. At one end of the spectrum, there is the 
so-called Feeling Theory, according to which emotions consists in states, such as bodily 
sensations, that are characterised by the way they feel, but which have no representational 
content (James 1890; Lange 1885; Whiting 2011). At the other end of the spectrum lies 
the Judgmental Theory, according to which emotions are or necessarily involve 
conceptually articulated judgements, so that to fear something would amount to judging 
that the thing in question is fearsome (Solomon 1976; Nussbaum 2001). The main 
objections to the Feeling Theory are that it cannot take into account that emotions have 
intentional objects – we are afraid of a dog, angry at someone, etc. – and that it fails to 
make room for the fact that we assess emotions in terms of how they fit their object, such 
as when we say that it is inappropriate to feel fear at an innocuous spider. Apart from the 
fact that it does a poor job at accounting for the fact that emotions are felt states, what 
plagues the Judgemental Theory is that it is incompatible with the observation that one 
can undergo an emotion without possessing the relevant concepts – one can be afraid of 
something without possessing the concept of fearsomeness, for instance.
17
 
                                                          
14
 See Meinong 1917; de Sousa 1987 and 2002; Tappolet 1995, 2000, 2012; Johnston 2001; and Prinz 
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16
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 In conclusion, it appears that one can spell out Value-Emotion Equivalences that 
are not only plausible in themselves, but also that are well supported by emotion theory. 
There are a number of questions that need to be discussed to fully assess the proposed 
interpretation of the Value-Emotion Equivalence. The focus here will be on a problem 
that raises the question of what it is for a concept to be evaluative. 
 
2. Are affective concepts evaluative? 
 
Sentences like ‘Natacha’s pizzicato is admirable’ or ‘Pierre’s attitude towards foreigners 
is disgusting’ make it difficult to deny that affective terms are evaluative, in the sense that 
it is part of their meaning that they convey positive or negative evaluations.
18
 What 
appears to be expressed by the first sentence is praise, while the second sentence appears 
to express stark criticism. Thus, on the assumption that what is true of terms also holds of 
concepts, it is natural to think that affective concepts like admirable and disgusting are 
inherently evaluative in the sense that a concept like admirable would by essence be a 
positive evaluative concept, while the opposite is true of disgusting.
19
 
 As has gone largely unnoticed, these claims can be challenged. As will be obvious 
if one considers affective concepts to be a subclass of thick concepts, the reason is that 
the considerations that are used to argue that so-called thick concepts, such as 
courageous, generous or cruel, are not inherently evaluative, can easily be transposed to 
affective concepts.
20
 It will be useful to first consider a distinct challenge to the claim that 
affective concepts are evaluative. 
It can be agreed that being admirable is distinct from being admired, and being 
admirable is also distinct from being such as to cause admiration. What is admired, or 
what is such as to cause admiration, can be admirable but it need not be so. Given the 
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 I’ll assume here that if a term or concept is inherently evaluative, it is also inherently valenced, but see 
Dancy 1995: 265 for the claim that thick terms and concepts are evaluative in their meaning, but yet 
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 It is not clear that it makes sense to ask whether a concept, understood as a content component of mental 
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analogy with concepts such as bendable, or expansible, in which the suffix ‘-able’ or ‘-
ible’ expresses a possibility (what is bendable being what can be bent, and what is 
expansible being what can be expanded), one could suggest that admirable, disgusting, 
and so forth, can similarly be parsed as what can be admired, what can disgust, and so 
on. If so, concepts such as admirable or disgusting would not be evaluative. In reply, one 
could suggest that it is simply obvious that admirable and disgusting are evaluative, or 
indeed normative, concepts. Clearly, that reply will not convince someone who doubts 
that such concepts are evaluative. The likely rejoinder to such doubts is that there is an 
important difference between bendable and admirable in that the fact that something is 
bendable does not entail anything about its goodness or badness, whereas that something 
is admirable seems to entail that it is good, or in fact good to a high degree, in at least one 
respect. Generally, it appears that when we describe things in affective terms we place 
them on scales that goes from the best to the worst (pro tanto), or simple from better to 
worse (pro tanto). Being more or less admirable entails being more or less good at least 
in a certain respect, while being more or less disgusting entails being more or less bad at 
least in a certain respect. 
However, that affective concepts are thus connected to good and bad is what can 
be challenged in the light of the discussion of the thick concepts, a type of concept which 
is thought to be opposed to thin concepts.
21
 Typical examples of thick concepts are 
courageous, generous, and cruel, whereas good and bad are typical examples of thin 
concepts.
22
 While the former are thought to involve both an evaluative and a descriptive 
aspect, the latter are thought to be purely evaluative or normative. A question which has 
attracted a lot of attention is whether the two components of thick concepts can be 
disentangled into an evaluative (or normative) component and a descriptive component.
23
 
In order to show that the components can be disentangled, some, like Simon Blackburn 
(1992), have argued that thick concepts are not inherently evaluative, or more precisely, 
that on the assumption that thick concepts are by definition inherently evaluative, there 
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are no such concepts. What is of interest here is not so much the entanglement issue than 
the question whether thick concepts are inherently evaluative.
24
 The Variability 
Argument that has been presented is based on evidence that suggests that thick terms are 
contextually variable in evaluative valence.
25
 This is taken to show that the evaluations 
that thick terms and concepts are used to convey are not part of their meaning, but depend 
on context. Two kinds of examples have been and still are discussed. First, there are 
examples involving comparative locutions, such as ‘too tidy’ and ‘too industrious’ (Hare 
1952: 121). What is suggested is that even though ‘tidy’ and ‘industrious’ as typically 
taken to convey positive evaluation, they have what appears to be literal uses in which 
they express criticism. In the second kind of example, unmodified thick evaluative terms 
or concepts appear to convey an evaluation that is opposite to the usual one, such as when 
we say ‘Yes, cruel certainly, but that’s just what made it such fun’ (Hare 1981: 73), or 
‘This years’ carnival was not lewd. I hope it’ll be lewd next year’ (Väyrynen 2011: 8, 
who acknowledges Eklund, p.c.). 
Now, the striking fact is that affective terms and concepts allow for the same kind 
of examples. One can say ‘This person is too admirable to be really likeable’ or ‘The 
Halloween outfit was not disgusting enough’. In the first sentence, ‘admirable’ appears to 
have changed its valence for the sentence appears to convey criticism, while in the 
second sentence, ‘disgusting’ appears to convey a positive evaluation. In the same way, 
one can say ‘Yes, disgusting certainly, but that’s just what made it such fun’ or ‘This 
years’ Hallowen outfit was not really disgusting. I hope that it’ll be disgusting next year.’ 
On the basis of such examples, it appears easy to argue that affective terms and concepts 
are not inherently evaluative. 
The question is what to think of the Variability Argument. In fact, there are good 
reasons to resist the argument. A first point to note is that concepts like good and bad, 
whose status has not been questioned, allow for the same kind of examples. Thus, a wine 
can be said to be too good to be used for cooking (Väyrynen 2011: 7). And one can also 
have cases of simple predication, such as when one says ‘Yes, bad certainly, but that’s 
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just what made is such fun’, or ‘This years’ performance of the conservative party was 
not bad. I hope that it’ll be bad next year’. Such examples should make us suspicious. 
Let us first consider the cases involving comparatives. As Väyrynen (2011: 5-9) 
notes, the way modifiers such as too and not … enough behave in general explains how a 
concept may appear to flip its valence. What such constructions involve are implicit or 
explicit standards of comparison, and it is relative to such standards that the evaluative 
content of the whole expression can be understood. In Väyryen’s words, ‘the standard for 
counting as satisfying too F or not F enough, is typically neither the same as the standard 
for satisfying F nor determined by the same factors’ (2011: 7). For example, the standard 
for satisfying loud is clearly distinct from the standard of satisfying not loud enough to 
keep the neighbours awake or from that of satisfying too loud than is safe for hearing. An 
interesting point that this example brings to light is that too and not … enough can take a 
non-evaluative concept, such as loud, to form a complex evaluative concept. This bolsters 
the case against the Variability Argument, for there is no more reason to believe that loud 
becomes an evaluative concept in such a context than there is to believe that tidy, 
industrious, etc. change their valence. 
 What about the unmodified cases? A number of moves are available to defend the 
view that thick concepts are inherently evaluative. A first point to note, however, is that 
in so far as concepts and not only terms are concerned, it will not do to invoke the 
distinction between semantic meaning and speaker meaning.
26
 The reason is that this 
distinction has no equivalent at the level of concepts. Thus, the suggestion that a term like 
‘lewd’ is used ironically, such as when the speakers mocks the sort of prudishness 
involved in the standard use of the term, cannot be transposed to the level of thoughts and 
concepts. But there are other moves open to the invariantist. 
A reply that works at both levels is that which appeals to the distinction between 
predicative and attributive uses of terms and concept.
27
 Consider a typical predicative 
adjective, such as ‘green’. When you say ‘this is a green ball’, what you say is ‘this is a 
ball and this is green’, so that if something is a green ball, it follows that it is green. By 
contrast, an attributive adjective, such as ‘big’ or ‘tall’, functions as predicate modifier. 
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But when you say ‘this is a big mouse’, you obviously don’t say ‘this is a mouse and this 
is big’. A big mouse need not be a big pet, and it is clearly not big qua mammal or 
animal. Now, evaluative terms and concepts appear to allow for both attributive and 
predicative uses. When you say that something is a good knife, this does not entail that it 
is good as such, for relative to a different kind of thing, such as being a weapon 
(compared with a gun or a carronade, say) what you consider need not be good. In such 
cases, what is good is not good simpliciter but relative to a standard. In other cases, 
however, such as when we say that knowledge is good, there seem to be no such 
standards. When we say or judge that knowledge is good, we don’t say or judge that 
knowledge is good qua F, while it could be bad qua G.
28
  
With this in mind, let us return to the question whether thick terms and concepts 
are inherently evaluative or not. What can be suggested is that at least in some cases, 
apparent inversions are due to the attributivity of the term or concept. As Väyrynen 
(2011: 10) notes, being frugal qua college master might be a bad thing, while being 
frugal qua person might be a good thing. In the same way, being cruel or disgusting 
might be a good thing qua joke, for it might add to its amusingness, while being quite bad 
qua public address, say. It might be the case that relative to some standard, a term or 
concept has a fixed valence, such as when frugality is predicated of persons, but relative 
to other standards, the valence can shift (Väyrynen 2011: 11). The important point is that 
the variability in attributive uses does not entail that the concept itself is variable. 
The example of the joke that is all the better for being cruel or disgusting 
indicates a second reply to the Variability Argument, one that uses G. E. Moore’s 
Principle of Organic Unities. According to Moore ‘The value of a whole must not be 
assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts’ (1903/1998: 28). The idea is 
that if two elements are put together, the resulting whole may have either more or less 
intrinsic value than the states would have if they existed alone. Moreover, on a holistic 
interpretation of this principle, the parts retain their value when they are put together in a 
whole.
29
 This idea can be put to work in reply to the Variability Argument as follows: 
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being bad in some respect might add to the positive value of a whole, something which 
explains the apparent valence shift. For example, a joke that includes a dose of cruelty or 
disgustingness might be all the better for it. 
A last reply to the Variability Argument that appears promising is to appeal to a 
particular kind of contextual enrichment. So-called ‘free enrichment’ is a mechanism by 
which additional information is provided by the context, such as when ‘I have had 
supper’ has to be interpreted as ‘I have had supper tonight’ given the context.30 The 
transposition to concepts is not straightforward, but one way to go is to consider what 
happens in cases of contextual enrichment that depend on specific concepts, such as 
indexicals. When I think that I am hungry, the context determines that it is me, Christine, 
who is hungry. In same way, one could suggest that when it seems to me that I think that 
I have had supper, the context can be such that what I really think is that I have had 
supper tonight.  
The suggestion, then, is that what explains the apparent variability is that what 
appears as a complete sentence or thought is in fact incomplete but gets filled in by the 
context. Thus, the sentence ‘he is frugal’ might express a negative evaluation not because 
‘frugal’ is negatively valenced, but because the context is such that what is uttered or 
thought is negative, such as in ‘he is frugal to the extent of stinginess’. In this example, 
what would be expressed is that the person is too frugal, so that it is not a surprise, given 
what we have seen above, that the sentence conveys a negative evaluation. The context 
might also provide a particular standard relative to which the standard valence of a term 
or concepts appears inversed. Thus, given a particular context, the sentence ‘He is frugal’ 
might have to be understood as ‘He is a frugal College master’. Thus, the reply that 
makes use of free enrichment reinforces the one that is based on the distinction between 
attributive and predicative uses. 
 If this is on the right lines, there are several explanations of the apparent 
variability in valence, some of which are cashed out in terms of mechanism that work 
together, such as free enrichment and relativisation to a standard. Of course, it cannot be 
excluded that some examples cannot be explained by the working of these mechanisms, 
but the onus lies with the advocate of the Variability Argument to make their case. As 
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things stands, it is safe to assume that affective terms and concepts are inherently 
evaluative. It follows that Value-Emotions Equivalences are not threatened by worries 






It is not only difficult to deny that affective concepts such as admirable, shameful, and 
disgusting are intimately related to emotions, but as we have seen there are reasons to 
believe that such concepts are conceptually tied to emotion concepts. There are obvious 
lexical ties between the corresponding terms. Moreover, the formal objects of emotions 
are picked out by affective concepts. And finally, putative affective properties and 
emotions share important structural traits. According to a plausible suggestion, the 
relation between affective concepts and emotions can be expressed in the form of what I 
have called Value-Emotion Equivalences, according to which something falls under an 
affective concept if and only if feeling the corresponding emotion is appropriate in 
response to that thing. As was underlined, there are quite different ways to read such bi-
conditionals, and their plausibility varies depend on how they are understood. What I 
have argued is that the representational interpretation, according to which an appropriate 
emotion is one that is correct from the epistemic point of view, has the virtue of making 
the Wrong Kind of Reason objection easy to handle. It is also well-supported by what 
appears to be a plausible account of emotions, the Perceptual Theory of Emotions, which 
underlines the analogies between emotions and sensory perceptual experiences. 
An important worry is whether concepts such as admirable are genuinely 
evaluative. I have argued that even though the variability considerations that are used to 
argue that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative can easily be transposed 
to the case of affective concepts, these considerations fail to show that such terms and 
concepts are only evaluative in the pragmatic sense that they have evaluative uses. The 
cases in which affective terms appear to have a different valence from the standard one 
can be explained in terms of a number of mechanisms, such as relativisation to a standard 
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and free enrichment, so that there is no need to abandon the intuitive claim that such 
terms and concepts are inherently evaluative. 
 Before I close, I would like to flag a further worry, which is related to the fact that 
some evaluative concepts, such as courageous, generous or good, seem to lack close ties 
to emotions. This alleged fact raises doubts about the prospect of finding Value-Emotions 
Equivalences for each and every evaluative concept. The question at stake is whether all 
evaluative concepts have a conceptual connection to emotion concepts. This is not the 
place to discuss this issue in any depth, but let me sketch a possible way to handle it.  
In fact, the worry splits in two. First, it concerns thick concepts, that is, concepts 
such as generous and courageous, which, as we have seen, are thought to combine both a 
descriptive and an evaluative (or more generally normative) component. The question is 
whether Value-Emotions Equivalences hold for such concept, given that it is far from 
obvious that such concepts are as closely related to emotions as affective concepts are. 
This question is related to the difficult issue concerning the relation between the 
descriptive and the evaluative (or normative) component. Following John McDowell 
(1978; 1979), many deny that thick concepts can be analysed or disentangled into two 
distinct components.
32
 The reason this question is related to the worry about the 
generality of Value-Emotion Equivalences is due to the fact that the most obvious way to 
relate thick concepts and emotion concepts is by spelling out the relation between thick 
concepts and affective concepts. The idea is that it is because of its connection to the 
admirable that the courageous and the generous are connected to admiration. The 
question is how exactly to spell out such an idea, but in principle it appears feasible to say 
that an action is courageous if and only if that action has specific natural properties, such 
being performed in spite of a perceived threat, in virtue of which it is admirable.
33
 
The second part of the worry concerns the most general evaluative concepts, such 
as good or bad. Such thin concepts also appear to lack an obvious connection to emotion 
concepts, something which is a problem for the claim that evaluative concepts are, quite 
generally, tied to emotion concepts. One might be tempted to postulate emotions that are 
tailored for the good and the bad, respectively. A difficulty with this proposal is that none 
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of the known lists of emotion kinds, whether they are drawn from folk-theorising, from 
philosophy, or from other fields, mention such emotions. A more plausible way to deal 
with this issue is to claim that good and bad are related to positive and negative emotions. 
Thus, one could suggest that something is good if and only if it makes positive emotions 
such as admiration, joy, or pride appropriate, whereas something is bad if and only it 
makes negative emotions such as contempt, sadness, or shame appropriate. To assess this 
proposal, the main question to address is what positive and negative emotions are. This is 
in fact a more difficult question than it might seem to be, because what might appear to 
be the most natural proposals (that is, proposals in terms of hedonic tone or in terms of 
motivation) face serious difficulties.
34
 In the end, it might be that what positive emotions 
have in common is that they are tied to positive evaluative concepts, while negative ones 
are tied to negative evaluative concepts. Whether this makes for too tight a circle is a 
good question. In any case, the hope of specifying what is characteristic of evaluative 
concepts, as opposed to non-evaluative concepts, in terms of their relation to emotion 
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